Much about today’s decision was not unusual: The Court was split five-to-four, along typical ideological lines (Thomas, Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, and Scalia in the majority, Sotomayor, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens dissenting). The case made sweeping changes in federal election law, overturning previous Supreme Court cases and clarifying language in others.
But there were quite a few things about the Citizens United announcement and opinion that were unusual.
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On to unusual detail number two. As mentioned above, this case has been going on for quite some time. ... But in this case, the Court instead asked for re-argument this fall, meaning that they heard argument in the case twice. Why did the Court ask for the re-argument? Essentially, to address additional issues beyond the narrow ones on which the Court originally granted cert., including whether the Court should overrule precedential cases upholding restrictions on political spending by corporations.
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Finally, unusual detail number four. Justice Stevens read his dissent (or some of it – if he had read all ninety pages, we’d still be in Court) from the bench. While the author of the majority opinion will often select a key portion of that opinion to read from the bench, it is quite unusual for a dissenter to do so. When it happens, it’s a sign that the dissenter feels very strongly that the Court got it wrong. Because the Court has a stake in operating as a uniform body – which is what keeps the rule of law alive, after all – dissenters generally “respectfully” dissent, both in writing (check out the last line of almost any dissenting opinion) and in conduct.
From the dissent
V.
["Today’s decision is backwards in many senses. It elevates the majority’s agenda over the litigants’ submissions, facial attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories over narrow statutory grounds, individualdissenting opinions over precedential holdings, assertionover tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality. Our colleagues have arrived at the conclusion that Austin must be overruled and that §203 is facially unconstitutional only after mischaracterizing both the reach and rationale of those authorities, and after bypassing or ignoring rules of judicial restraint used to cabin theCourt’s lawmaking power. Their conclusion that the societal interest in avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption does not provide an adequate justification for regulating corporate expenditures on candidate elections relies on an incorrect description of that interest,along with a failure to acknowledge the relevance of established facts and the considered judgments of state and federal legislatures over many decades.
In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on the need to limit corporate campaign spending shouldoutweigh the wooden application of judge-made rules. The majority’s rejection of this principle “elevate[s] corporations to a level of deference which has not been seen at least since the days when substantive due process was regularly used to invalidate regulatory legislation thought to unfairly impinge upon established economic interests.” Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 817, n. 13 (White, J., dissenting). At bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining selfgovernment since the founding, and who have foughtagainst the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majorityof this Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court."] JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[i.e. the dissenting Supreme Court Justices DO NOT RESPECTFULLY DISSENT. ed']
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